The purpose of this article is to explore the political dynamics of employer coordination in three well-known "coordinated market economies." We examine differences in how employer coordination has been organized in Germany, Sweden, and Japan in the area of industrial relations, and we examine the extent to which such coordination represents a selfsustaining equilibrium, as some of the most influential treatments suggest. To preview the findings, we argue that developments in the last two decades have introduced new strains in industrial relations institutions in all three countries, as an intensification of cooperation between labor and management in some firms and industries has disrupted the more overarching forms of coordination on which these systems previously rested. All three cases are characterized not so much by a full-blown breakdown of coordination, but rather by the emergence of new or intensified forms of dualism-different in each case based on different starting points-in which continued coordination within a smaller core has in some ways been underwritten through the breaking off of other, more peripheral, firms and workers. The varieties of capitalism literature has provided a powerful corrective to a previous wave of theorizing that saw traditional labor institutions, especially in "coordinated market economies," as extremely fragile in the face of neoliberal ideology and more volatile international markets since the 1980s. Much of the previous literature was premised on the idea that globalization would push all countries toward neoliberalism and deregulation, encouraging firms to lower labor costs and increase labor market flexibility while undermining the power of unions to prevent these (Kapstein; Katz and Darbishire; Martin and Ross). However, convergence theories predicting a uniform slide into deregulation have not been borne out
However, as an empirical matter, we know there have been and in some cases continue to be rather significant tensions at work in traditional industrial relations institutions in coordinated market economies, including those that are the focus of this article, Sweden, Germany, and Japan. In Sweden, tensions were already high in the 1980s but came to a head in 1990 when the national confederation of Swedish employers (SAF) dismantled its own bargaining unit and (a year later) withdrew entirely from the tripartite structures that had traditionally defined that country's particular (and particularly centralized) version of coordination. In Germany as well, serious strains in traditional industrial relations institutions have been evident, especially since the 1990s as declining union membership and problems within key employer associations have resulted in a noticeable drop in collective bargaining coverage in some core industries. Finally, in Japan as well, recent years have witnessed some well-publicized retreats on the part of key employers from traditional practices including, above all, seniority wages and to a lesser extent commitment to lifetime employment.
Such tensions and changes in these institutions are enormously difficult to get a handle on if we stay within the varieties of capitalism framework, and we think that a part of the problem has to do with the key concept of "coordination." There are several related issues (for elaboration, see Thelen 2002) . First, employer coordination is a quite undifferentiated and, in practice, often essentially bimodal concept that often enters into the analysis as a "condition" or characteristic that some countries have and others lack. Second, and related to this, much writing in the VOC literature (including, self-critically, Thelen 2001 ) is based on a very stylized and highly composite (national-level) picture of employer interests. Thus, in this literature, employers (as a whole-within a given country) in coordinated market economies are seen as "invested" in various institutions (wage bargaining institutions, etc.), and from this it follows that they will have an interest in maintaining these institutions-among other things, as the site within which they can continue to coordinate among themselves, to the benefit of all.
In what follows, we examine employer coordination as a political problem in Sweden, Germany, and Japan in the contemporary period. Rather than looking at employer interests from the perspective of a highly composite view, we focus on the problem of sustaining employer coordination in a context in which the interests of various segments of capital (and for that matter, labor) are diverging in the face of new market conditions, and where coordination is sustained in part by a political settlement among them (often also the exercise of power or dominance of some firms or industries over others). Contemporary market conditions do not just activate new conflicts between labor and capital (as is widely known and theorized); they also activate new tensions and strains among firms and industries that are differently situated in domestic and international markets. Rather than thinking of coordination as a "thing" or "state of affairs" that whole countries either have or don't have, we think it is much more useful to conceive of coordination as a political process and something that is not at all self-sustaining but in fact has to be constantly nurtured and "patched up," and sometimes renegotiated entirely.
By disaggregating "employers" (and "labor") and by adopting a more explicitly political approach to the problem of "coordination," we are able to embrace and incorporate some of the core insights of the VOC perspective, especially regarding the continuing interests of some employers in traditional industrial relations institutions and practices. At the same time, we address the tensions in these institutions that the VOC literature tends to Coordination as a Political Problem August 2004, 7 ignore or minimize. In contrast to the VOC literature, which sees all feedback in these systems as positive and stabilizing, we argue that precisely the intensification of cooperation between labor and management in some firms and industries (that the VOC literature emphasizes) has paradoxically had deeply destabilizing feedback effects that have undermined or are undermining these systems as they were traditionally constituted. The next sections lay out the dynamics for Sweden, Germany, and Japan, respectively.
SWEDEN
Among the coordinated market economies, Sweden was notable for the high level of centralization that traditionally characterized industrial relations there. Between 1956 and 1983 , the broad parameters for wage settlements covering most of the economy were set at the national level in peak negotiations between the main (blue-collar) union confederation, LO, and the national confederation of Swedish employers, SAF (Martin, 1) . This system broke down, in a halting way in the 1980s but decisively and apparently irreversibly in the early 1990s when SAF eliminated its own bargaining unit (leaving its counterpart on the union side, LO, no one to negotiate with) (Pontusson and Swenson 1996b, 224 ). Wallerstein and Golden single out Sweden as one of two cases-along with Britain-of significant institutional change in collective bargaining in the 1980s and early 1990s (Wallerstein and Golden) .
Developments since the early 1990s do not, however, point to a full breakdown of all coordination and a free fall into decentralization; instead, wage bargaining has reequilibrated on the basis of a very different pattern of coordination. Currently, the Swedish system is characterized by highly coordinated bargaining across industries within the export sector (including much stronger cooperation than ever before between unions organizing blue-collar and white-collar workers)-combined however with much looser coordination between the exposed and sheltered sectors of the economy. 2 Sweden's touted system of solidaristic wage bargaining, which had resulted in a significant compression of wages across the economy, was a main casualty in the reorganization, as reflected in growing wage differentiation within and especially between these broad bargaining clusters (Wallerstein; Hibbs and Locking).
Many accounts treat the breakdown of the traditional Swedish model as the result of an "employer offensive," either politically or economically motivated (Pontusson and Swenson 1996b; Martin) . Swedish employers had originally agreed to centralized bargaining as a way of ensuring wage moderation; however, over time the system had come to deliver wage settlements that were both rigid and highly inflationary (Martin 1991, 33) . Pontusson and Swenson (1996b) explain the demise of the old system with reference to developments in the late 1960s and early 1970s that turned employers against it by extending the terms of wage solidarism in ways that fuelled rather than dampened wage rivalries across and within sectors. First, the less productive public sector, which had been excluded from solidaristic wage policy as it was originally conceived, demanded and won agreements that brought its workers' wages in line with those in the higher-productivity private sector. This was accomplished through so-called earnings guarantee clauses that compensated workers in sectors that did not experience postnegotiation wage drift for gains made by workers in those that did (Martin, 35; Pontusson and Swenson 1996a, 232-233) . Second, early solidaristic wage policy focused only on intersectoral wage disparities and did not touch on differences 2. In the system that prevailed prior to the developments described here, there was high coordination across industries in bargaining for blue-collar workers (under the auspices of the trade union confederation for blue-collar workers, LO) but white-collar workers were organized into their own unions (TCO and SACO, between skilled and unskilled workers. However, in the late 1960s unskilled workers were able to use their political power within the LO to win clauses in central contracts that would compensate them for skilled workers' previous year's wage drift. These provisions had produced a chronic, institutionalized ratcheting up of wages, as wage drift in manufacturing rose in the 1980s to 50 percent for both white-and blue-collar workers (Elvander 1997, 13; Martin, 35) .
The negative effects of these developments were felt especially intensely in the engineering industry, and the employer association in that sector (Verkstadsföreningen, or VF; later renamed Verstadsindustrier, or VI) led the drive for bargaining decentralization in the 1980s and 1990s. The VF/VI had opposed the wage-leveling clauses cited above as early as 1974 (Martin, 85) but its appeals found no resonance among employers in other industries that were less affected by them. In the absence of movement on these issues in national negotiations, the VI in 1983 decided to go it alone and withdrew from traditional peak (confederal) bargaining altogether, striking a separate deal with the metalworkers' union, Metall. This dealt a decisive blow to the traditional nationally coordinated system, one from which that system never really recovered. export sectors (but especially in the engineering industry), at the expense of traditional, more encompassing forms of coordination and solidarity (see also Iversen). First, and notably, the initial break with centralized bargaining (in 1983) was not accomplished through conflict, but instead took the form of a deal in which the VF offered the metalworkers' union (Metall) a wage increase above what the union had demanded, but in exchange for decoupling negotiations from the peak bargain and eliminating contractual provisions that compressed the wages of skilled and unskilled workers (Pontusson and Swenson 1996a, 228) .
A wage offer that exceeded the union's own demand would in any event have been hard to decline. However, in addition, Metall had also developed its own reasons for disliking aspects of the wage system as traditionally constituted and as practiced under the new (expanded) terms of wage solidarity discussed above. Among other things, engineering workers had come to think of public-sector workers as "pay parasites" (Pontusson and Swenson 1996a, 234) and deeply resented their ability to free-ride on the productivity gains in engineering through the compensation clauses mentioned above.
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Beyond this, the interoccupational leveling clauses (between skilled and unskilled workers) had also become a problem for Metall, which had increasingly found itself in competition with its private-sector white-collar counterpart, SIF, for high-skilled members within the metalworking sector. As Martin has pointed out, developments in engineering had blurred the line between skilled blue-collar and white-collar occupations, so that the work of some metalworkers was similar to that of SIF members but at a lower rate of pay (Martin, 36) . The elimination of the interoccupational leveling clauses sought by employers thus resonated in some ways with the 4. These longstanding tensions broke out into an open quarrel at the LO's annual congress in 1986 between the heads of Metall and the union of municipal workers (Kommunal) (Martin, 36). union's own interests, and the 1983 contact added a fourth pay category on top of the previous three (Martin, 36) .
Since the late 1990s, Sweden has seen the reequilibration of bargaining on new terms, with the export-dependent industrial sectors coordinating strongly (both across sectors and also between blue-collar and white-collar unions)-but separate from the sheltered, lowerpay public and service sectors. Bargaining might have resettled at a somewhat lower level of coordination (separate bargaining for each industry, for example). However, the 1995 bargaining round was crucial in highlighting the potential pitfalls (for employers) of a lack of cooperation across the industry sector. In that year, a very high settlement in the (thenbooming) paper and pulp industry disrupted negotiations in the metalworking industry, leading to costly work stoppages and, ultimately, a higher settlement (see Thelen 2001 for a more extended version; also Elvander 1997, 49-50; Kjellberg) . While employers continue to oppose vociferously any recentralization of national bargaining under the auspices of the LO and SAF, the events of 1995 underscored the disadvantages of completely uncoordinated (industry-level) bargaining in a context in which unions are capable of backing up their demands with actions that export-dependent industries find extremely expensive in highly competitive and tightly integrated global markets.
The lessons employers learned in 1995 set the stage for a reconfiguration of bargaining that is based on a strengthening of cooperation between labor and capital within the export sector, but largely at the expense of more encompassing forms of solidarity on the union side. In a move spearheaded by the head of the metalworkers' union, Göran Johnsson, Metall and other LO unions in export sectors joined with the white-collar SIF (the TCO :Tjänstemännens Centralorganisation union for salaried employees in industry), and in 1996 issued a public invitation to their counterparts on the employers' side to engage in joint negotiations over wage formation and mediation procedures (Dagens Nyheter, 1 June 1996, A4; see also Elvander n.d., 15). The result, less than a year later, was a new "Agreement on Industrial Development and Wage Formation" that among other things is designed to support "constructive negotiations" and to avoid "the need to resort to industrial action" (18 March 1997, appendix A, paragraph 1). The industrial agreement promotes coordination among employers and cooperation between unions and employers on a number of fronts (see especially Elvander n.d., on which we draw here). The agreement calls for the parties to it to appoint an "Industry Committee" composed of equal numbers of representatives of unions and employers who then oversee the implementation of the agreement. Among other things, the Industry Committee puts together special joint working groups to promote ongoing exchange of views and joint opinion formation on a variety of issues such as EU legislation, research and development, and the like. In addition, the Industry Committee established an Economic Council for Industry (ECI) in 1997 which is composed of four independent economists who produce reports to inform collective-bargaining positions and negotiations.
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The deal also puts in place new mediation procedures designed to facilitate coordination across the export-oriented industrial sector and avoid costly industrial conflicts.
To this end, the Industry Committee selects a group of five to ten impartial chairmen who can then be tapped individually to accompany industry-level wage negotiations, to facilitate peaceful compromise within industries, and to broker informally coordination across the exposed sector (and ensure that these industries set the pattern for the economy as a whole).
The powers commanded by the impartial chairman are much enhanced over the previous 5. This is a major innovation compared to previous arrangements, in which economists who produced such reports were specifically linked to (and often directly employed by) either labor or employer associations. rather weak form of mediation that had existed in Sweden. Among other powers, under the new agreement the impartial chairman can request a response from one or both negotiating parties to questions put to them by the independent Economic Council, put forward proposals of his or her own aimed at resolving particular issues (or, if the parties agree, even direct that individual issues be resolved through arbitration), and delay industrial action for up to 14 days (Elvander n.d., 22) . It is especially important that under the new agreement, negotiations (under the guidance of the impartial chairman) are taken up well in advance of the cancellation of existing agreements.
For the unions, but especially for Metall, the agreement was important in prompting the VI to abandon its earlier efforts to push for full decentralization, thus ending years of struggle in this key industry over the structure of negotiations.
Precisely these developments signal and institutionalize the end to solidaristic wage bargaining as it had come to be practiced in the 1960s and 1970s. As such, these developments have been associated as well with heightened "tensions between unions representing low-paid groups and other unions whose members are in a better position" (EIROnline, October 1997; SE9710145F) . Indeed, and as many commentators have noted, in the pattern bargaining system that has emerged under the industry agreement, local government and private-sector service workers have more or less been "left behind" (EIRO online October 1997; SE9710145F)-an outcome that is fully embraced not just by employers but also by unions in the key export sectors. In the 1998 collective bargaining round (which in industry took place under the auspices of the IA), there was some informal coordination among blue-collar unions in the LO, but prominent unions in the export sector (above all metalworkers and paper workers) "threatened to back out if the low-paid were given 'too much'" (EIROnline SE 9710145F).
These new arrangements sideline the national trade union confederation LO rather completely, which is why the organization has been generally unenthusiastic (if resigned) about the industry agreement. The LO has generally been casting about for a way to resuscitate some national-level forum in which it could continue to play a central role. One opportunity appeared to present itself in 1999 when the government (partly in response to the success of the mediation procedures adopted in the export sector) formed a commission to explore the possibility of creating a new national mediation authority. Initially, the LO had favored the idea, hoping that an overarching national arrangement would supercede and subsume the industrial sector and on the assumption that national mediation machinery would facilitate the linking of wage settlements across the economy and, with that, restore the LO to an important role in the bargaining process. However, representatives of the export sector (on both the labor and employer sides) opposed any government machinery that would circumvent or supercede the successful procedures they had worked out for themselves, a position that was respected in the legislation that ultimately emerged in 2000.
Public-sector workers, for their part, were concerned with protecting their relatively newly won (1965) Important for the present argument, the negotiations and consultations surrounding the establishment of the Mediation Institute revealed the constellation of interests and power relations behind the "new" Swedish model. The LO's initiatives in the context of the debates on government-sponsored mediation were, as some commentators have noted, the LO's "last cry for help." However, neither the recommendations that came out of the commission nor the ensuing legislation reflected the LO's interests. All intimations of a resurrection of wage coordination on an economy-wide basis were vehemently rejected not just by SAF and the main employer associations for industry, but also by unions of white-collar salaried workers-whose wages had traditionally been held back in the old system. More important, they were also decisively rejected by leading industrial unions such as Metall. Far from 7. Sixty percent of Swedish workers are covered by collective agreements that contain provisions for mediation and are therefore exempted from the statutory system set up in 1999-2000. longing for the old system, Metall wants no part of any movement that would revive or reinstate the previous power of the peak union confederation, LO. Summarizing developments from the early 1980s to the present, one could conclude that in the Swedish case, "employer coordination" has proved more resilient than adherents to a strict neoliberal offensive thesis might have predicted. Full decentralization to the plant level-as advocated in the 1980s and 1990s by prominent firms such as ABB, Volvo, and Ericsson-has been averted, and there is significant coordination across the industry sector as a whole. At the same time however, the issue of "who is coordinating with whom" has shifted decisively-from coordination at a very encompassing, confederal level (but with white-and blue-collar workers negotiating separately), to coordination across the blue/whitecollar divide and across export industries (but separate from public and private service sectors).
The changes described above amount to a significant renegotiation of the terms of coordination, accomplished in two steps. In the first move, from confederal to industry-level bargaining, employers sloughed off several layers of coordination that they had come to view as a drag on their ability to restructure production on the shop floor and to compete www.eiro.eurofound.eu.int/2001/feature/se0105195f.html.
8. One telling episode occurred in 2000, when Hans Karlsson, head of the LO negotiating department, was planning a bid to be elected second chairman of the LO (while keeping his role in the negotiations department). This was opposed by Metall chief Göran Johnsson, who was against LO making any bid to resume its old role in wage coordination and any return to wage solidarity on the old lines. Karlsson in fact effectively in increasingly competitive international markets. Above all, VI's initial withdrawal from peak negotiations dealt a double blow to solidaristic wage bargaining as traditionally practiced in Sweden (i.e., producing wage leveling both across industries and between skilled and unskilled workers within individual sectors). While some of the literature had treated this first move as an example of a neoliberal offensive by employers against labor, we have argued that it is actually more properly understood as the result of an intensification of cooperation between labor and capital in the metalworking industry at the expense of solidarity and coordination across sectors. We can say that Sweden is a coordinated market economy before and after. But something significant has shifted. Above all, the LO has been decisively relegated to the distant sidelines when it comes to wage negotiations, and with that, wage solidarity on the old terms is irretrievably gone. Employers are, as one employer representative put it, "dead against" any return to national-level bargaining (under whatever auspices, either LO or under resigned both positions in the face of Metall mobilization against him and the likely prospect of defeat at the next LO election. the auspices of the new national mediation institution that would supercede their own industry-level arrangements) but in their campaign against any such recentralizing initiatives they have been massively aided and abetted by the most powerful industrial unions (especially Metall) which have their own reasons to support the arrangements described above, and which rest on a new form of accommodation between labor and capital within key export industries.
GERMANY
A great deal of scholarly attention has been directed at the current strains in Germany's collective-bargaining system, and much of the literature is quite pessimistic. No one predicts a complete convergence of Germany's relatively centralized model on, say, the U.S. system, but here too it seems clear that there are serious and undeniable pressures at work-and the outcome is in many ways still much more in flux at present than in Sweden.
The most sobering recent trend in Germany, by far, is the current organizational disarray in the Association of German Metalworking firms (Gesamtmetall) and its union counterpart (IG Metall), which together have played the key flagship role in Germany's de facto system of pattern bargaining over the last several decades. Whereas in Sweden bargaining coordination had traditionally been formally institutionalized and at the national level, in Germany coordination was more informal and occurred in pattern bargaining at the multi-industrial level under the informal leadership of the metalworking industry. This is precisely where new and significant "cracks" in the system have appeared. On the employer side, a number of firms within the metal association have grown increasingly critical of "rigid" central contracts and have begun calling for reforms that would inject much greater flexibility to adapt central bargains to the needs of individual firms. More consequentially still, a significant number of firms have voted with their feet, withdrawing from the association and thus also from the terms of the central bargains it negotiates with the union.
The origins of these tensions go back in part to a divergence in interests between different employers within Gesamtmetall itself. The system has traditionally rested on a particular kind of accommodation between the country's large export firms and its sizeable sector of small and medium-sized firms (Mittelstand). The core of the deal was one in which large firms dominated the employer association (and its main decision-making bodies), but typically also bore the burden of industrial conflict in order to secure moderate settlements with the unions on a range of issues, including but not limited to wages. These settlements, it is important to note, did not exhaust the ability of these large firms to pay, but corrections were made at the local level in the form of wage drift and other forms of übertarifliche
Leistungen.
Changes in the market context over the last 15 or 20 years have disrupted this basic deal. In the face of more competitive markets (and also tightly linked production networks relying on just-in-time production), the costs to firms of industrial conflict have gone up dramatically (for example, as disruptions in production result in lost market shares that cannot be recovered).
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In this context, core firms that have traditionally dominated the employer association have become conflict averse in the extreme. Until the mid-1990s, the usual ritual was for any union strike to be met with a more or less equally effective lockout (or plausible threat of lockout) by the employer association; however, starting in 1995 (arguably much before, it only became manifest in the mid-to late 1990s) the association was simply unable to continue this pattern. Those employers who were affected by or threatened with industrial conflict openly shied away from any hard-line position and instead pressed the association to settle. The kinds of firms that had traditionally borne the brunt of industrial disputes for the association as a whole simply refused to do so. These were firms that could anyway absorb a somewhat higher wage settlement and much preferred that to shouldering the burden of a conflict with unions that would bring losses in the market for which they could not be compensated by the association and from which they could not easily recover.
This situation led to a series of industry settlements in the late 1990s and early 2000s that came much closer than ever before to exhausting the ability of the strongest firms to pay.
Evidence suggests that the flexibility previously afforded by übertarifliche Leistungen began to evaporate in these years. On the basis of a survey of nearly 8,000 firms (in eastern and western Germany), Bellmann, Kohaut, and Schnabel show that the percentage of firms paying wage increases over the collective bargain dropped from 60.6 in 1993 to 48.9 in 1997.
Among those firms paying higher wages higher than those in the collective bargain, the amounts they were paying in excess of the negotiated increases had also fallen by two percentage points (averaging across all firms) over those four years.
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What this means is that the weaker firms were being forced to pay wages much closer than before to those of the strongest companies. 11 situation that obviously changed when other producers (such as Japanese automakers) moved into the high end, often with lower prices.
10. Lutz Bellmann, Susanne Kohaut, Claus Schnabel, "Ausmaß und Entwicklung der übertariflichen Entlohnung," IW-Trends, 2/1998, Jg. 25.
11. Hassel and Schulten (1998) , "Globalisation and the Future of Central Collective Bargaining" and Hassel (1999) , "The Erosion of the German System of Industrial Relations." This appears to be one of the These developments have produced highly corrosive feedback effects, prompting a hemorrhaging of the employer association itself, as weaker firms opt out of the industry-level contract altogether. Sometimes these firms are cut loose entirely; in other cases they find their way into new employer associations that have been hastily constructed by, and alongside, the old organizations and that promise all the previous benefits of membership but do not commit member firms to the terms of the contracts negotiated with the unions (Verbände ohne Tarifbindung). Either way, these firms are no longer covered by industrywide collective bargaining. This has snowball effects, because of course the more the weaker firms opt out, the more the bargaining comes to center on the strongest and most conflictaverse companies (Thelen and van Wijnbergen) . Employer associations in Germany always had to deal with divergent interests of highly heterogeneous membership bases. In the past, the German system allowed for a significant degree of wage flexibility across firms.
However, as we have seen, the previous "buffer effect" of wage drift that helped to hold diverse firms together has begun to evaporate.
Intensified reliance of Germany's core firms on continued peace and stability in their relations with labor at the plant level has begun to feed back in deeply paradoxical ways, stabilizing the system in a formal sense (by deflecting demands for formal decentralization and allowing the union to reach settlements with employers in collective bargaining rounds), while at the same time undermining the deeper foundation on which the system rests (because central bargaining over time comes to cover a shrinking number of firms). Union victories in specific collective bargaining rounds in the late 1990s (due in large part to lack of unity among employers) were therefore highly ambiguous, since union leaders saw clearly reasons why, against the trend in most other advanced industrial countries, wage inequality in Germany has been declining, not increasing. We thank Jim Mosher for suggesting this to us. that their own ability to conclude binding and encompassing agreements hinges on continued organizational viability on the employer side as well. This explains why in the 1990s, in the wake of a particularly successful bargaining round (from the union's perspective) leaders of the metalworkers union worried openly about the weakness of the employer association, seeing employer weakness as one of labor's most pressing problems.
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These developments pose new and difficult dilemmas for unions like the IG Metall, as the breakdown of employer solidarity produces feedback effects that complicate enormously the problems of coordination on the labor side as well. The workers in Germany's core firms (on whom, traditionally, the union too has relied to carry it through in organized large-scale conflicts with employers) know perfectly well how conflict-averse their employers are, and where employers are willing to pay more it is very difficult-to say the least-for the union to ask them for less. The particular composition of German unions magnifies this dilemma. Whereas Swedish unions organize nearly the entire workforce (80-90 percent), the German unionization rate is-has always been-significantly lower (30-35 percent). Traditionally, the weaker presence of the union in other firms (especially smaller firms) was compensated by the fact that these firms were members of the employer association, which meant that their workers, too, would be covered by the industry contract.
However, as these employers defect from the system, collective bargaining becomes more narrowly concentrated on core firms, implying the danger for the union that it becomes increasingly clientelistic and focused even more narrowly on the stronger rather than weaker 12. See Offenbach Post, 10 December 1996, which quotes a representative of the union as saying, "Chaos reigns at Gesamtmetall; it is a catastrophe." See also union president Klaus Zwickel's response to the IG Metall victory in the 1995 strike. Far from gloating, Zwickel was openly worried about Gesamtmetall's organizational problems and emphasized that "collective bargaining autonomy requires strong bargaining partners," Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 6 April 1995. See also, more recently, Zwickel's comments in Handelsblatt, 24 March 1999, which argue that the union wants strong associations that are able to bring "strays" back into line. segments of the working class.
The problems for employers in maintaining solidarity and coordinating capacity have thus spilled over and begun to affect internal politics within the union. There have long been thinly veiled disputes within the union between those advocating a more hard line position in negotiations with the employers and those who favor a more reformist path that seeks to shore up social partnership though targeted concessions including concessions on employers' demands for greater flexibility in bargaining arrangements. Such internal disputes account for the union's hesitant and at times seemingly erratic strategic course in recent years.
Overtures and signals by the IG Metall of a willingness to accept some trade-off between wage restraint and employment have often been followed by determined calls for an end to moderation (Ende der Bescheidenheit). Some union leaders have been willing to agree to more moderate collective bargaining outcomes (e.g., greater differentiation in industry-wide deals along dimensions such as working times). However, such concessions are becoming harder to sell internally. Indeed, every movement in that direction exposes advocates to challenge from internal opponents who push for a more aggressive stand by the union.
Internal disputes were vividly on display during and after an ill-conceived strike in the eastern metalworking industry in 2003. The specific demand on the table was a reduction in weekly working times in the east, from 38 to 35 hours, to match levels in the west. The demand was widely criticized by economists and had been rejected by union leaders in a number of regions the previous autumn (Spiegel, 23/2003, 83) . The head of the union, reformist Klaus Zwickel, had warned that a push for general working time reduction in the East had no chance in the current economic and market environment (ibid.), but his vice Coordination as a Political Problem August 2004, 24 president Jürgen Peters pushed forward and (narrowly) carried the day in the relevant decision-making bodies.
The strike failed, a first for the IG Metall since the 1950s. Early signs of trouble were reports of strike breakers-normally not a problem in Germany-and controversies about the presence of western workers on eastern strike posts. The strike collapsed entirely when workers in western plants in industries affected by the conflict refused to allow the union to expand the strike to the west-a sign of lack of solidarity that had its roots in the western workers' conviction that they were not prepared to upset harmonious relations in their own companies in the context of what they considered an ill-conceived campaign.
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The behavior of employers in this conflict was also noteworthy-and especially in light of their own internal difficulties. Gesamtmetall president Martin Kannegiesser specifically did not take advantage of a golden opportunity to capitalize on the IG Metall's weakness and internal strife. Instead and quite to the contrary, Gesamtmetall appeared willing even in the rather late stages of the strike to do what it could to help union leader Zwickel arrive at an agreement that would allow the union to save face (Tagesspiegel, 29 June 2003, 24) . To no avail, however, as Zwickel had long since lost control of the situation.
Summarizing again:
In Germany, elements of stability and change are inextricably linked in fact. The intensification of cooperation between large firms and works councils (which lies behind some relatively generous settlements of the 1995-2001 period among other things) had helped to fuel discontent within the employer camp. These developments, 13 The conflict amounted to the playing out of a power struggle within the union itself, and the most consequential fallout of the strike was to bring these divisions and conflicts vividly and painfully into the public spotlight. The schism that emerged centered on competing factions associated with contending candidates for the union leadership. Reformists and hard-liners each blamed the other for the loss of the strike, but so deep is the schism and so evenly divided between the two sides that the union has recently decided to allow the leaders of both factions to (try to) govern together. in turn, undermine solidarity as well on the union side, as they play into a natural divide between workers in more profitable and productive enterprises and those in more marginal firms. In other words, the German case makes it clear that the feedback effects generated by intensified cooperation between labor and management within traditional institutional arrangements interact with changes in the external environment in ways that introduce new strains (or in this case, render old ones salient in a new way).
What we see here is that employer coordination rests on a particular balance of power within key employer associations and between these and unions. That being the case, the continued viability of these institutions is not really a question of labor's successful defense of the system (as in the neoliberal offensive thesis), nor however does it follow automatically from the efficiency effects of these institutions (as in the VOC perspective). Rather, continued stability relies on the reproduction (or perhaps renegotiation) of the political settlement on which these institutions rest. And, against the overall optimistic leanings of some of the VOC literature, it seems there is nothing to guarantee that German employers (or unions, for that matter) will succeed in reconstituting their organizations on the basis of a new coalition or internal balance of power, despite the fact that their failure to do so might well be against their individual and collective interests.
JAPAN
Many aspects of traditional Japanese industrial relations practices are also under undeniable tension and strain. Leftists criticize these challenges as a total attack on labor and implicitly assume that weak labor cannot resist this attack. Proponents of neoliberalism and deregulation celebrated initial reforms in industrial relations as the opening move in a broad, efficiency-enhancing, reform movement but lamented the slow speed of change. Therefore, we can observe contradictory views on how Japanese management practices have changed:
leftists tend to emphasize change, while reformists tend to emphasize the stickiness of traditional practices. But as in Germany, the outcome seems to be uncertain at present in Japan.
Two important components of Japanese management practices are seen as changing the most, namely, the system of "lifetime" employment practices and the seniority wage.
First, business leaders and economists began calling for the abandonment of "lifetime" employment in the 1990s. Some economists argue that in order to revitalize Japanese industrial "competitiveness," management should dismiss redundant workers and abandon the "lifetime" employment commitment. The long economic downturn since the bursting of the bubble economy has robbed management of confidence in long-term employment. A 1997 survey of firms by the Economic Planning Agency reveals that although 94.7 percent were currently following a "long-term" or "relatively long-term" employment practice, 38.8 percent predicted they would quit this practice in five years (Nikkeiren Times, 23 April 1998). As the financial-sector crisis deepened in 1998, more companies began discussing restructuring, which in fact means layoffs. According to the survey of labor economy (Rodokeizai Doko Chosa), in the early 1990s, employment adjustments were mainly done by reducing overtime work and job reassignments within the same firm or firms in the same keiretsu group. In the late 1990s, the percentage of early retirements increased (Ministry of Health, Labor, and Welfare).
Most reformers believe that introduction of the individualized performance wage would be a first step to transform the Japanese employment system as a whole. This is because the seniority wage system institutionally supported "lifetime" employment by giving workers an incentive to stay in the same firm. The seniority wage has increasingly been taken over by "performance"-based wages. In the seniority wage system, the worker's salary is expected to increase over the course of his/her career in the firm. How and why this wage system has prevailed in major Japanese companies have not been fully determined academically, as some argue this is based on the needs of workers, while others focus on accumulation of skill over their careers. However, it is well known that such a wage system is an effective incentive mechanism for workers to stay in the same company for a long period. Employer organizations, such as Keidanren (Federation of Economic Organizations) and Nikkeiren (Japan Federation of Employer Associations), 14 have eagerly advocated reform of the seniority wage system, which they have come to see as a source of rigidity in Japanese firms.
To explore this problem, let us first address briefly the genesis of seniority wages. In the turbulent days immediately after World War II, Japanese labor unions demanded wage increases based upon the notion of a livelihood, need-based wage. The livelihood wage was logically solidaristic in nature because it did not count a worker's ability or the company's profitability. It is also natural that wages were expected to increase based on seniority, because a worker needs more money as he establishes his family. Based on this seniority wage system, it was easier for unions to organize industry-wide wage negotiations.
Management began challenging this wage system and trying to "enclose" labor's wage demands within individual companies. In 1950, Nikkeiren contended that "management 14. These two employer associations merged into one big employer organization, Nippon Keidanren (Japan Business Federation) in May 2002. should reject wage demands based upon the cost-of-living and should seek to institutionalize the rational wage system based on assigned job, because wage is a reward for labor." However, Nikkeiren failed to transform the wage system into a job-based one.
Explicit and implicit reactions from labor toward the job-based wage system forced management to change a job-based wage plan to a job "capability"-based wage. As job capability is learned in the company over time, it shares some similarities to the seniority wage. This is a kind of compromise between labor and management, but this wage system turned out to be economically rational, as long as it took workers' skill levels into account.
In the 1980s, many economists argued this wage system successfully motivated workers to invest in their skills (e.g., Koike).
However, as mentioned above, the seniority wage system has been under attack since the 1990s. One reason is that total labor cost is increasing as the share of older workers increases. This is a result of demographic change, the aging of Japanese society, but the prolonged recession in the 1990s made it more difficult for many companies to bear this increasing labor cost. A second reason is an alleged change in the nature of the seniority wage system, which has come closer to an automatic wage raise for many workers despite different job capabilities among workers of the same age. 15 Third, in some industries, especially electrical equipment, the skills needed in production have changed rapidly due to the "IT revolution." Skills acquired on the job and over a worker's career in a firm are less valuable today compared to new skills that engineers with training (from outside the firm) in 15. As described before, the seniority wage system was a compromise between management, who wanted to make it more merit-based, and unions, which wanted to keep it need-based. Many companies have their own pay tables, consisting of detailed job capability classifications and ranks within each classification. The basic idea is that if a worker acquires skill, he can climb up the ladder and receive pay raises. Unions expected that most workers would climb this ladder according to seniority, while management hoped it could be selective in classifying individual workers and thus could motivate them effectively. In the 1980s, management tended to be less selective but gave automatic raises. information technologies can provide for these companies. In these industries, the seniority wage system, even if it functions well, falls short as a mechanism for effective skill formation (Miyamoto) .
Consequently, management in many companies tried to reform the wage system by abolishing the seniority wage. One method was to place greater emphasis on workers' performance. In the old system, management paid for the skill of workers, whether it was actually utilized in production or not. Some companies now want to pay wages based on what the workers actually do rather than their potential job capabilities. Job-based wages are one example, while MBO (management by objective) is another way, in which a given worker is assigned a specific goal once a year and can receive wages to the extent the assigned goals are achieved. This is the most individualized pay system.
Resiliency. However, there are also phenomenal countertendencies at work in Japan.
First, employers cannot easily abandon their strong commitment to long-term employment.
In 1995, Nikkeiren published a report, "A Japanese Management System in the New Era,"
advocating three types of workers should be deployed effectively: long-term employed workers with accumulated skills, workers with professional skills, and short-term/flexibly employed workers. This report is often interpreted as evidence that Nikkeiren abandoned its commitment to Japanese employment practices by advocating the use of mobile professional workers and flexibly employable part-time workers. But what is also important is that it still believes the first type of worker should be the core of the labor force and is essential to Japanese enterprises. At the individual enterprise level, similar observations are made. For instance, management at Matsushita Electric Industry Company was shocked when many workers opted for a new pay schedule not premised on long-term employment rather than the traditional pay schedule, when management asked workers to choose. Furthermore, many employers worry that better workers who can find better jobs outside tend to leave their companies, damaging the companies' competitiveness. According to a Nikkeiren survey of 255 member companies conducted in 1998, although 76.2 percent predicted increased labor mobility, they worried about several negative impacts: weakened worker commitment to the company, weakening cooperation within the work organization, and less investment in skill formation.
It is intriguing that
16. Nikkeiren chairman Hiroshi Okuda advocates "capitalism with a human face." Although he is known as a committed reformer as a chairman of the board of Toyota Motors, he does not believe in liberal, Anglo-Saxon type capitalism. This Nikkeiren stance is sometimes contrasted with Keidanren, which is believed to be one of the main forces to transform Japanese economy in a liberal way. After their 2002 merger, some worried that Keidanren's preference would prevail over Nikkeiren's, but it was decided that Chairman Okuda would be the first president. This means Nikkeiren preferences may prevail in the new organization (Nippon Keidanren).
In a nutshell, employers are not sure to what extent long-term secure employment should be reformed or how to accomplish it. Here we can see the efficiency of the traditional management practice producing resiliency, as the VOC thesis predicts. The same observation can be made for the reform of the wage system. It is true that more companies have actually implemented reforms of the wage system than of "lifetime" employment, introducing performance-based wage systems. However, they are more careful in introducing it than popularly believed. Again, they are not sure to what extent the wage system should be individualized, given the nature of the Japanese group-oriented work process. Fujitsu, regarded as a pioneer of wage reform in the 1990s, introduced a performance-based annual salary system for managers in 1993, and then expanded it for all employees, abolishing the seniority element in the wage portfolio. However, company management realized that workers became too concerned with short-term goals and the company itself has lost its ability to develop competitive products. In 1999, Fujitsu decided to incorporate the company's performance as a whole as well as the individual worker's performance into the salary calculation (Nikkei, 5 February 2000) . Fujitsu management also realized that it is important to evaluate workers' potential ability and "work process" independent of "outcome" (Asahi, 19 March 2001) .
How to make an individualistic performance-based wage compatible with a grouporiented work organization is a very tough task for management. Nippon Steel Corporation decided to introduce a new performance-based wage system for its Electronics and Information Division independent of other steel divisions. However, management says an individualized wage system that creates "winner takes all" situations would weaken the work organization. Management therefore decided to take performance of the division as a team into account in wage calculations. Similar adjustments are often made in many companies that are trying to reform the seniority wage system (Nikkei, 5 February 2000) . Some companies (e.g., Seiko) realize that in order to develop workers' skill, a simple "outcome"-based evaluation would not work effectively (Nikkeisangyo, 27 November 2000) .
Employers of the companies that implemented wage system reform realized it is difficult to keep workers' commitment and morale high with the new performance-based wage. A company that pioneered reform of the wage system, Takeda Chemical (the largest pharmaceutical company in Japan), found it difficult to keep workers committed to the company under the new performance-wage system. A survey conducted by the Takeda union shows that the percentage of workers who supported the wage reform decreased from 52.4 in 1997 to 46.4 in 2001. More interesting, while 52.3 percent thought their working conditions were better than those in other companies, 48.9 percent answered that the company became less attractive to the workers except for its better pay. Takeda management has been continuously fine-tuning its wage system in order not to demoralize workers (Yanagishita) . Recently, Fujitsu also decided to revise its performance-based wage to promote long-term competitiveness, emphasizing capability rather than immediate outcome (Takewaki and Suyama, (77) (78) (79) .
These companies are eager to preserve some essential features of management practices, though implementing impressive reforms in order to maintain their institutional competitiveness. Labor economists found that companies that invest in R&D tend to employ more regular full-time workers with secure employment (Higuchi, 341) . Furthermore, without secure employment, workers would not acquire the necessary skills for a given company, which would reduce the company's technological advantage (Chuma) . It is telling that while Toyota is willing to reform its wage system toward greater performance orientation, it continues to emphasize job capability and group performance in wage determination. Furthermore, it seems to be Toyota's conviction that secure employment should be the basis of its competitiveness. When Moody's Investors Service downgraded Toyota's long-term debt from Aaa to Aa1 claiming that its commitment to "lifetime" employment would hamper its competitiveness, Toyota management counterargued that such an employment practice should be a source of strength (Nikkei Sangyo, 1 October 1998).
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Nissan is another interesting case. It was taken over by the French automaker Renault in 1998 due to its financial difficulties and went through a very tough restructuring with massive dismissal (in the form of voluntary retirement). However, after achieving a Vcurve recovery, president Carlos Ghosn made it clear that the company's main strength should reside in worker commitment to the firm, and he maintained a bottom-up decisionmaking style, which is regarded as very Japanese. In wage bargaining for 2001, Nissan management unilaterally declared that it would pay the full amount of bonuses demanded by the union. Management was concerned with how to revitalize work organization. Even the information and technology company Fujitsu, which was the vanguard of wage-system reform in the 1990s, is willing to maintain secure employment as a basis of its competitiveness.
Here again, the debate has a "glass half empty, glass half full" quality. Those who see globalization as having an overall deregulatory bias say current changes on the margins are the "opening wedge" and it is just a matter of time before the system breaks down. The VOC perspective predicts greater stability given that employers are still and in some ways more dependent than ever on worker willingness to invest in skills (lifetime employment) and on cooperation on the shop floor. As the discussion above shows, the hesitation on the part of employers to abandon traditional practices is very much rooted in concerns about the likely impact of this on production and productivity.
Divide between Winners and Losers. In the Japanese case, again, the paradox of these two competing sets of claims can be resolved by disaggregating "employer interests."
In a nutshell, we can observe two phenomena. First, many Japanese companies are faced with difficulties in reforming their management system, which contributes to the resiliency of the Japanese system. Second, successful companies are able to maintain substantial features of the traditional practice though with adjustments, while losers gradually abandon or are forced to abandon such features, which is what gives the impression that the Japanese system is changing. The second phenomenon is rather new and emergent, but it is here that we can observe a similarity with the case of Germany: an intensification of cooperation between labor and management in some key firms in order to increase firm competitiveness, which, however, makes it more difficult for weaker firms to keep pace and live up to the traditional practice.
For instance, the automaker Mazda is reforming its wage system into a job-based one:
an assigned job rather than the worker's capability is the basis of the wage calculation. This is partly because its management has been taken over by Ford Motors. But it is also true that Mazda cannot afford Toyota-style wage and employment practices.
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Some informed observers found that many companies implemented wage-system reform in order to reduce total labor costs, so much so that they demoralized workers and could not improve their companies' competitiveness (Yanagishita) . Some companies faced with financial difficulties could not but implement reforms as losers.
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However, some companies implement reforms in order to maintain or promote their competitiveness. They tend to carefully preserve some essential strengths of the traditional system targeting core workers and maintaining labor-management cooperation, even if they adopt the performance wage and introduce a more flexible workforce as we show above.
Thus we can find a widening divide between losers and winners.
Winners, such as Toyota, seem to believe this is the result of the survival of the fittest and continue to cooperate with labor to keep their competitive advantage. However, the more these winning companies care about workers as a source of their strength, the more difficult it becomes for losers to go with them. They, like Mazda, have to move away from the traditional employment practice. Here, labor-management cooperation within the enterprise is creating new tensions and a divide between winners and losers.
Tensions in Employers'
Coordination. This emerging divide is now seemingly jeopardizing employer coordination in Japan. In the cases of Sweden and Germany, it is easy to locate the sites at which employer coordination occurs. There, centralized collective bargaining is an obvious mechanism through which employers coordinate their strategies with each other in their relations with labor. In Japan, by contrast, many traditional industrial relations practices are company-based and therefore seem not to rest on coordination among employers.
However, this is misleading. The seniority wage system and "lifetime" employment practices are possible only with significant coordination among employers as well as with unions. The seniority wage system, for example, is only viable where all employers in the core sector agree not to outbid each other for entry-level workers. That is, all firms have to agree to start workers at relatively low wages and let their earnings rise over the course of 18. Toyota's sales per employee is twice as large as that of Mazda (Nikkei sangyo, 24 March 1997). their careers in the firm. This is linked to the commitment to lifetime employment because the firm cannot maintain a commitment to lifetime employment and ongoing skill acquisition if has to pay to hire its skills from outside the firm. In other words, lifetime employment only works if (1) workers start at low wages, and (2) they gradually acquire skills that make them ever more valuable to the company. In both cases, then, traditional practices rest on a degree of employer coordination in wage determination. In this, the Shunto wage bargaining has been very functional, though it started as a union tactic to increase wages.
Shunto is a concerted, interindustry movement for an annual wage increase. The biggest national labor federation of the day, Sohyo (General Council of Trade Unions in Japan), defined it as a way to overcome the weakness of enterprise unionism in achieving wage increases by arranging wage struggles across industries at one time in the year so as to set the pattern of wage increase for the year and to standardize wage increases across industries, including the unorganized sectors.
Several studies show an interesting finding that wage increases were not just determined by market forces but also by social considerations (Sano, Koike, and Ishida, (98) (99) . According to a Ministry of Labor survey of 3,000 companies asking what factor contributed the most to wage determination, in 1970 41.2 percent picked company profits, 32.5 percent picked the average wage increase of other companies, and 15.6 percent said to maintain their work force. This was the behavioral basis for wage standardization. It is important to note that Shunto facilitated this behavior by setting wage negotiations at one time in the year, making it easier and sometimes inevitable for management and labor to compare their wages with others'.
Within this Shunto framework, intensive discussion and informal negotiations start well before the formal negotiation. Usually the national and industry-level actors, such as Sohyo and Nikkeiren, continue discussion about the adequate level of wage increase for more than three months. This is a very political process, in which union and management negotiate tactically, but also a process for them to share information. This process contributed to moderate wage increases in the 1975 Shunto in which how to survive the economic crisis after the first oil crisis became the issue. Union wage moderation is believed to be the important reason why the Japanese economy recovered from the economic downturn so quickly. The increasing hegemony of unions in the private export-oriented sector, notably in the metal industry (as in Germany), played an important role. Since the 1960s, the metal industry had become the main pattern-setting industry. This export-oriented sector cared about its competitiveness, and unions, organized in the IMF-JC (International Metal Workers' Federation Japan Council), demanded "economically rational" wage increases. This wage level then prevailed across industries. Thus, employers benefited from this Shunto coordination as a way to control competition (Sako and Sato, 255) . Given this framework, they could maintain the seniority wage system as well as the "lifetime" employment commitment as effective incentive mechanisms for workers.
However, in the 1990s, as some companies began introducing performance-based wage systems and at the same time taking their companies' performance more into account, levels of wage increases among firms within the same industry became more diversified. This trend was strengthened by the fact that each company became more willing to compensate its workers in the form of bonuses rather than a raise in monthly salary, in order to maintain flexibility in managing total labor costs.
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What is important for our analysis is that the performance-based wage system has made it very difficult to maintain the Shunto system as it was. One important function of Shunto for management is coordination. Wage increase in the pattern-setting company in the given industry, for instance Toyota among automobile assemblers, is linked to other companies' within it. And the wage increase level in that industry is again linked to other industries as a benchmark.
However, the performance-based wage tends to break this practice. It becomes more difficult to coordinate wage increase levels once individual company management uses its own profit level as a basis of wage determination, much less individual workers' performance. This was more so in the 1990s when winners and losers within the same industry became clear. For instance, two companies that adopted the performance-based wage, Takeda Chemical Industry and Mitsui Mining and Smelting, left the Shunto framework altogether.
In this context, Toyota's wage negotiation in the 1997 Shunto is very interesting. At an early stage, Toyota management claimed that wage increases should be moderated in order to change the "high cost economy." Employers argued that because of the internationally high labor cost, it had become disadvantageous for them to do business in Japan. They criticized wages in the protected sectors, such as service and energy, as too high. Toyota management worried that if Toyota, which was actually booming thanks to the weak yen, raised the regular wage, it would spill over into other industries and exacerbate the 19. It is easier to reduce bonuses than salaries. Furthermore, because the size of the bonuses became a topic of the Shunto wage negotiation in the 1990s, it has become more difficult to find a standardized wage high cost problem. Instead, Toyota argued, the increase in company profit should be distributed in the form of bonus payments, which are less linked to the Shunto (Nikkei, 20 March 1997) .
However, at the very last stage, Toyota management decided to increase its regular wage by a larger margin than other companies in the metal sector did. This was a surprise attack on many companies. Toyota was believed to play the role of pattern setter, taking the national economy into account, because its former president was then president of Keidanren, the most prestigious national employer association. The president of Nissho (Japan Chamber of Commerce and Industry), representing small business, criticized Toyota for its unilateral decision. Other auto companies had to catch up with Toyota by adding extra raises, which could damage their competitiveness by squeezing capital for reinvestment in the long run (Nikkei Sangyo, 24 March 1997) . Faced with criticism, Toyota's president Hiroshi Okuda flatly said that Toyota should not care about other companies or industries and should choose the best way for itself. He believed that in the days of globalized competition, survival of the fittest was the rule. It was very important for Toyota to motivate workers in order to make its work organization more competitive (Nikkei, 20 March 1997) .
But this trend of diversification may backfire. First, some uncoordinated competition may appear between firms. Another winner in the auto industry, Honda, which increased its market share dramatically, tried to pay wages closer to those paid by Toyota, although its labor cost is much higher than Toyota's. Nissan tried to pay large bonuses to motivate its workers against Toyota in 2001. This competition may create some problems in controlling labor costs even for Toyota in future.
level.
Even more interesting is the impact on losers. In the traditional Shunto negotiation, the management of winner companies took the situation of losers into account in setting wage levels, which allowed losers to maintain similar wage policies. But in uncoordinated competition, it becomes very difficult. As we argued above, this uncoordinated competition drives loser companies to introduce more individualistic performance wages as a solution to reduce labor costs and better motivate workers. It also weakens commitment to secure, longterm employment.
However, this change within the losers' camp may create new tensions for winners.
Recently, fewer and fewer young Japanese workers take secure and long-term employment seriously. This trend has been exacerbated substantially by the individualized performancebased wage system and loosened employment commitment among employers. If this is the case, Toyota and other winning companies won't be able to motivate workers with secure employment in the near future.
Even in very "Japanese" companies such as Matsushita Electric Industrial Company, the majority of newly recruited fresh graduates are not sure they will continue to work until retirement age. The more companies abandon an employment commitment, the more young workers, who are expected to be the core workforce, will lose confidence in the Japanese employment system. This concern seems to be why Hiroshi Okuda, former president of Toyota and now president of Nikkeiren, declared that companies are responsible for secure employment. This seems to be a far cry from coordination among employers to defend the collective interest of employers.
The effects of these trends on union coordination are also important in Japan. As discussed above, wage coordination through Shunto has been very useful for employers. But it should be remembered that Shunto was invented as a union tactic. And now coordination is gradually failing, partly because of union initiatives. The Steel Workers Federation adopted an alternate-year wage negotiation in 1997. The Electrical, Electric, and Information Union (JEIU) endorsed the performance-based wage in 1997. These changes further weakened coordinating function of Shunto by de-linking wage increases across industries (Weathers 2002) . One official of the JEIU in the 1996 Shunto commented, "We couldn't stand our wage raises being used by unions in other industries as springboards to get raises higher than ours" (cited in Weathers 1999 , originally Asahi, 9 March 1996 . It seems that unions in export-oriented sectors, which used to be the main player in keeping Shunto to "economic rationality," are now playing a role in its dissolution. But this is based on a kind of labor-management cooperation.
We may be able to say that, like in Germany, instabilities in the traditional system are not produced by a neoliberal offensive against labor. Rather, they are generated by the policies of large, successful firms to pay workers well and guarantee their employment. The efforts create pressures that weaker firms can only address by retreating from traditional practices.
CONCLUSIONS
In the cases of Sweden, Germany, and Japan, new market dynamics since the 1980s and especially the 1990s have introduced new strains into previous institutions of employer coordination. The new tensions are both more interesting and more intractable for defenders of the systems to address than a straightforward neoliberal offensive --in which we would be seeing employers pressing for decentralization and deregulation and unions seeking to defend Coordination as a Political Problem August 2004, 42 the system. Instead, in all three cases, we find that recent market developments have brought an intensification of cooperation between labor and management in some companies and industries that has complicated traditional forms of coordination (at higher levels) among employers and solidarity among workers on which these systems previously rested.
The point of this essay has been to explore the effects of recent developments on employer coordination in Sweden, Germany, and Japan. In each case we find that the varieties of capitalism literature is quite right to point out that contemporary market developments have in some ways intensified the interests of employers in particular kinds of (traditional) industrial relations institutions. Where this literature goes wrong, however, is in viewing employers within a given national context as essentially homogenous in their interests and, as a consequence, in seeing all signs of intensified commitment to traditional institutions by firms as operating to stabilize these institutions. What we have shown, by contrast, is that the intensification of cooperation within traditional institutions in some companies has in fact made it difficult for other firms to keep pace, and so we see a destabilization of the system that is brought about by precisely those forces that the VOC literature sees as sustaining the system. While Sweden may have found a new equilibrium or at least a stable resting point for coordination for the time being (which is still very different from that in the liberal market economies), Germany and Japan appear to be still in a rather fluid state of renegotiation and flux. The common trend across all three cases, however, is toward new or intensified forms of dualism-a growing divide between firms or sectors characterized by intensified cooperation between management and labor but facilitated and perhaps even Coordination as a Political Problem August 2004, 43 underwritten by a growing gap between practices and outcomes within the new core and those outside it.
